Roberto Cipriani
Introduction
There has been much discussion of possible definitions of religion. Generally a distinction is made between a substantive and a functional approach. The substantive approach may be exemplified by Durkheim (1995) when he speaks of “beliefs and practices” as the ground of the “moral community” called a “church”. Luckmann (1967) is said to demonstrate the functional approach when he refers to “symbolic universes” as “socially objectified systems of meaning” by way of “social processes” considered as “fundamentally religious”, “which lead to the formation of the Ego” and the “transcendence of biological nature”.
However, when we make a thorough exploration of Durkheim’s and Luckmann’s writings, we observe that Durkheim is also alive to function (religion helps solidarity), and that Luckmann is not only concerned with function (religion is a conception of the world made up of specific contents). Thus in reality those quoted as exemplary champions of one ore other perspective emerge as more possibilistic and open to less rigid, more polyvalent formulations. In short, contents and functions are inseparable, and should rather be considered as a unique whole which permits realizing much more complex and interconnected analytical and interpretative procedures.
For example, we might start from the idea that the meta-empirical referent in attributing meaning to human existence is a particular characteristic of religion. At the same time, however, it is sensible to leave an opening also for responses which do not envisage an explicit referral to the dimension of the empirical non verifiability and the inaccessibility of direct experience. Thus, a meta-empirical referent would possess a merely indicative character, or, in Blumer’s (1954) term that of “sensitizing”. “In this way there is no conflict between the transcendent level and that of the real. It is rather as though we were to look at the same object from two different viewpoints; the canalizing of a non-human presence within reality. One vision does not exclude the other. They are not in opposition and indeed at times they may converge on the same conclusion – the understanding-explanation of life in a religious key” (Cipriani 1997. 15).
From diffused religion to religion of values
Certainly, the presence of values is a constant both in the historic religions, more deeply rooted at the cultural level, and in the new religious movements still in a phase of growth and re-composition. These values represent idealistic motives, key concepts, basic ideas, parameters of reference and ideological inclinations which watch over the personal and interpersonal actions of individuals and make them reasonable, socially relevant and sociologically classifiable.
Every religious experience involves dedication to a cause, and ideal, with a socio-individual involvement which is more or less marked according to individuals’ intentions, utility (also in “rational choice” terms), their life history, opportunities offered, their encounters and the challenges faced. To say one belongs to a particular religion means essentially to share its general principles, basic choices and ritual procedures. The latter allow membership to become visible, permit encounters with co-religionists, legitimation of executive roles (real, not merely symbolic, power), reinforcement of belonging, and deepening of value-based motivations.
In other words, every performance of a ritual has multiple functions, but above all focuses the total values promoted and diffused by a particular religion through its members: the more these participate, the more they become convinced their choice was right.
The latter effect is so portentous that it remains in a weakened condition even without further continuing participation. Thus, the experience of religious practice (and belief) forms of its own accord an ideal, value-laden habitus which tends to persist far beyond visible religiosity. Indeed the person who no longer practices religion and is maybe ever less a believer retains a kind of imprinting which cannot easily be erased, and which presents him as a disaffected member but with continuing meaningful links with the former reference group.
Undoubtedly much is owed to primary (essentially family) socialization rather than to secondary (school and friendship within peer groups). The Berger and Luckmann (1966) lesson in this regard remains authoritative: in fact, the social construction of reality is the basis from which the value system branches out, a circuitry which directs social action and rests on an objectified and historicized world-view which is thus endowed with a religious character it is hard to lose. The ultimate meaning of life itself is clearly written therein and orientates attitudes and behaviors.
However, it may now be more convenient to aim at disarticulating religious phenomenology from within, following a reading with more stratified dynamics and multiple facetting. This is an alternative to distinguishing to the utmost between traditional religiosity linked to church structures and quite visible in its forms on the one hand, and a more individualized, privatized and thus less visible religiosity on the other. In practice it is not clear there is only church religion and invisible religion à la Luckmann (1967). Rather, we may propose another hypothetical solution which envisages intermediate categories more or less close to the two extremes defined in terms of visibility and invisibility.
An initial post-Luckmann interpretation was articulated in 1983 and applied to the Italian situation during the International Conference of Sociology of Religion (held at Bedford College, London): “beside the interests and pressures coming from ecclesiastical sources, are there any other premises or factors which can explain religious bearing on Italian politics? In particular, it is important to verify first of all how the institution fares under the pressure of an extended “religious field” containing varied and attractive options, including anti-institutional purposes. Secondly, we must ask ourselves whether in practice religious influence in political choices concerns only Catholicism (or Christianity) or any religious expression in general. Thirdly, we must see whether the country’s history or its national culture mark the existence of fixed elements, bearing common values leading (directly or indirectly, in specific or vague ways) to a widespread model of religious socialization (based prevalently on patters of Catholic reference)” (Cipriani 1984: 32).
The starting point was thus represented by the influence of the Catholic religion on politics in Italy. This was a fortuitous indicator which showed itself later to be very illuminating, also because it became increasingly possible to show that suchlike influence involved, and involves, circles much wider than politics. Indeed, after nearly twenty years it can be asserted today that the weight of religion in matters regarding decisions of a party and government nature has been reduced but it has remained quite solid as regards society in general. Meanwhile the anti-institutional spirit has lessened, given that the Catholic church is the institution least contested by Italian citizens, who moreover assign it a noteworthy portion of their taxes (the so called “eight per thousand”).
While the preponderant influence of official Catholicism has waned, other religious confessions have not replaced it. Only Judaism has managed on a few special occasions to have its celebrations and customs recognized. The ability of Moslems, Jehovah’s Witnesses and others to gain a hearing at political level is negligible.
On the other hand, the connection between Catholic religious values and values diffused in the social environment has been amply demonstrated. In many instances the two are superimposed on one another, if not wholly identical. In fact, having started from the concept of “diffused religion” referring mainly to links with the political dimension, we then arrived at a conception of religion in Italy as a web of value elements directly derived from the baggage of Catholic socialization.
Before going further, however, we should clarify what is originally intended to investigate in our research. “The leading concept, in this research, is that of “diffused religion”. The term “diffused” is to be understood in at least a double sense. First of all, it is diffused in that it comprises vast sections of the Italian population and goes beyond the simple limits of church religion; sometimes in fact it is in open contrast with church religion on religious motivation (cf. the internal dissension within Catholicism on occasion of the referendum on divorce and abortion). Besides, it has become widespread, since it has been shown to be a historical and cultural result of the almost bi-millennial presence of the Catholic institution in Italy and of its socializing and legitimizing action. The premises for the present “diffused religion” have been laid down in the course of centuries. In reality, it is both diffused in and diffused by. As a final outcome, it is also diffused for; given that – apart from the intents of so-called church religion – we can remark the spread of other creeds (the easy proselytism of other Christian churches, of the “Jehovah’s Witnesses”, of “sects” of oriental origin etc…), as well as the trend towards ethical and/or political choices (an eventual conflict – far form disproving this hypothesis – confirms, from the outset, the existence of a religious basis, be it weak or latent). In brief terms, it is licit to think of religion as being “diffused” through the acceptance of other individual or group religious experience, and also because it represents a parameter which can be referred to with regard to moral and/or political choices (Cipriani 1984: 32).
First of all, it is still valid to claim that diffused religion concerns broad strata of the Italian population. More than one study has established this conviction over time, and it has been enriched gradually by new variations on the theme, without distortion. In itself church religion too should also be basic to the origin of diffused religion itself. However, for reasons of exposition and to avoid misunderstandings it is preferable to regard it as a category by itself , to be deconstructed if required on the basis of attitudinal and behavioral differences of the subjects interviewed (usually grouped together according to stratification derived from cluster analysis). Moreover as regard diffused religion’s diversification as compared to institutional Catholic religion, this should be stressed from a sociological point of view so as to determine the differences between orthodox and heterodox modes in relation to the official Catholic model. However, the most relevant aspect is still the strong historico-geographical – and thus cultural – rootedness of the religion most practiced in Italy. It is precisely the strength of tradition, the practice of habit, the family and community involvement which make membership of the prevalent religion compelling and almost insurmountable. Where socialization does not arrive within the family home, pastoral and evangelizing activity carried out in a capillary way in the area by priests and their lay parish workers moves in. In fact, Catholicism is diffused in every part of the country by means of a church structure well-equipped over time and particularly able to draw on its quite effective know-how. The best proof of this effectiveness is provided by the easy proselytism effected by other religious groups and movements which have disembarked in Italy, particularly the Christian ones, though not only these. Another piece of evidence can be found in ethical and, especially in the past, political inclinations. These characteristics of diffused religion make it a non-autocratic experience, open to other options, careless of the theologico-doctrinal boundaries between manifold confessional memberships. The subjects of diffused religion are little inclined to join battle in the name of their ideal referents – but nor do they contest others over viewpoints that cannot always be shared.
“What “diffused religion” consists of can be understood even by means of its peculiarities. In a broad sense, its presence is clearly visible in forms which are not as evident as church religion, but which are not totally invalidated. This visibility may appear somehow intermittent” (Cipriani 1984: 32). Thus diffused religion also runs the risk of being classified as an “invisible religion” sui generis, though in reality it manifests that peculiarity of partly relating to church religion by way of participation in liturgical practices and religious rites, and partly to a “semi-membership” or even non-membership (in its most peripheral forms, almost bordering on total absence of socio-religious indicators).
“It is easy to presume that the widespread model of “diffused religion” is different from that of its source of origin, that is, this widespread religious dimension ends up by differing from the system it derives from (the institution). In this way, however, it reaches degrees of freedom which the concentrated and centralized pattern of church religion would not favor” (Cipriani 1984: 32). We might even speak of diffused religion as a perverse effect of the dominant religious system which thus generates what is different from itself, even though in continuity with it. The greater freedom in putting ourselves outside the church permits spaces for action otherwise prohibited. In short, there is no clear opposition, nor yet a clear linkage of diffused religion to church religion.
“The fragmentation of the areas of diffusion and distribution cannot, however, cover all existing spheres; all aspects are not equally widespread and reach vague, undefined limits which empirically are difficult to define. This diffusiveness broadens foreseeably into complex and multiple options (especially political options: from extreme right to extreme left). Meanwhile, original religious contents diminish and lose their intensity, they disperse, they mingle, they are integrated in new syntheses. Consequently, this expansion also causes a certain lack of positive reactions with respect to the center of propulsion, either because of increased separateness or because of a weakening of the basic ideological nucleus. It is thus a “passive” religion which may become active again in specific circumstances. Rather than the dynamics of accelerated religious transformation, this provokes a certain stagnation. Even within the prevailing passivity, the underlying echo remains persistent and pervasive, it penetrates large groups of persons. At this stage “diffused religion” appears rather under false pretences: as a feeling, a sensation which “contaminates” both the religious and political fields. Thus re-emerges the link with processes of socialization. It remains, however, to be seen if the future generations will maintain such a religious form which becomes more and more socially diluted to the extent of losing all influence on politics” (Cipriani 1984: 32-3). Despite its pervasion, diffused religion is not present in every case and every context. Indeed, it cannot easily be catalogued using homogeneous indicators. Usually, cluster analysis outlines three levels of diffused religion: the first seems closest to church religion, the second departs partially from it, and the third is situated on the margins of the continuum between church religion and diffused religion. If we look particularly at political placement, the whole ideological-party spectrum has its followers distributed among the three large areas of diffused religion. The member of these classes of diffused religion prefers solutions running from the right to the extreme left, thus excluding the extreme right, as is shown by a study carried out in Rome in 1994-5 (Cipriani 1997). At the level of values, the area of strictly religious values seems to be narrowing, but there is an increase in the area of lay principles – lay but vaguely inspired by, or capable of drawing inspiration from, orthodox religious models. It thus seems that diffused religion is destined to remain inert, at the mercy of other confessions, though its greatest attraction lies in relation to ongoing socialization.
The problem of change within diffused religion itself had already been posed some years ago. In fact, “even for someone who has always kept his sociological interest in current events alive, it is not easy to disentangle the guiding threads of the social, political, and religious dynamics which have characterized Italy in the last two decades. The fact is that one finds oneself in the present situation almost naturally, as though it had been expected, without even letting questions, doubts, or scientific curiosity about what has been happening to more than 50 million citizens, from the mid-1960s to the threshold of the 1990s, break the surface” (Cipriani 1989: 24). The fact is that while the contents of diffused religion change almost imperceptibly, the sociological approach also mutates, hones its instruments of empirical research, digs deeper into reality and searches for verifications and falsifications of its guiding hypotheses.
Truth to tell, until the end of the 1980s, strangely enough there were no scientific results available providing adequate reliability as products of serious, thorough and really representative studies at that statistical level in relation to the whole of Italy. It was thus in the wake of the questions raised by theorizing about diffused religion that a fruitful season of field research began – from the Sicilian study on “the religion of values” (Cipriani 1992) to the major national research on “religiosity in Italy” (Cesareo, Cipriani, Garelli, Lanzetti, Rovati 1995) and the most recent one, on an international level and with a comparison between Europe and the United States on “religious and moral pluralism”, still awaiting publication.
Especially during the last decade it has been argued that relations between Catholic church and the Italian state, though not wholly disappeared as a strategic point for examining the inter-institutional political-religious link based on citizens’ interest in problems of a legislative kind, are no longer a key test of the ability of the dominant religion to influence Italian political affairs. For the past, consider the diatribes of the ’70s and ’80s on divorce and abortion, not comparable to the current one on financing Catholic schools. Once the major questions on the diplomatic plane had been regulated solemnly on February 18, 1984 and by law on 20 May, 1985, which renewed the Concordat of 1929 between Italian state and the Vatican hierarchy, the “Catholic question” so-called seems to have lost its bite and its interest. The movement defined as Catholic contestation has also long ago shipped its oars and seems reduced now to a sporadic attempt at dissent as regards the Establishment – unless the Holy Year of 2000 provides new possibilities for a recovery of a critical kind, taking its lead from the jubilee program.
To some extent it is diffused religion itself which also represents a kind of functional substitute for divergence from the ecclesiastical structure. This differentiation appears through other ways of believing and practicing, even though the real base remains Catholic thanks to primary socialization in the initial phases of life. It should thus be stressed that ” “diffused religion” refers to the characteristic conduct of believers who have received at least a Catholic education and who relate to it in a general sense. In fact, it refers to citizens who appear to be less than completely obedient to the directives of the Catholic hierarchy but who, on the other hand, refuse to reject completely certain basic principles which form part of the set of values promoted by Catholicism” (Cipriani 1989: 28).
The essential core of diffused religion is to be found precisely in this set of values which are the basis for the sharing of outlook and practices which bring together Catholics and non-Catholics, believers and non-believers, on the same terrain of social action. In fact through this cultural mediation of shared values there runs a large part of decisions for enactment by social subjects. The ecclesiastical Establishment stays in the background, not intervening directly but in a mediated way, thanks, that is, to its prior socializing activity. There is no longer, if ever there was, a close adherence to orthodoxy and orthopractice as taught by the Catholic church, although the essential parameter remains Catholicism as the ideology determining perspective. It is precisely this which permits collaboration between the Italian state and the Catholic church without major disturbance and indeed with a formal, legitimated agreement which has now lasted over seventy years.
As Calvaruso and Abbruzzese (1985: 79) emphasize, “diffused religiosity then becomes the dominant religious dimension for all those who, immersed in the secular reality of contemporary society, though not managing to accept these dimensions of the sacred cosmos which are more remote and provocative compared with the rational vision of the world, do not thereby abandon their need for meaningfulness. In the immanent dimension of individual everyday existence, diffused religiosity, rather than bearing witness to the presence of a process of laicization in a religiously oriented society, seems to enhance the permanence of the sacred in the secularized society”. Thus diffused religion appears as an antidote to the process of secularization of which at the same time it is an expression which is meaningful as a taking of distance from church religion. In fact “diffused religiosity is located in an intermediate area between a secular society in crisis and a resumption of the ecclesiastical administration of the sacred. It remains too “lay” to accept the more specific elements of church doctrine and too much in need of meaning to survive in an epoch which is “without God and without prophets”” (Calvaruso e Abbruzzese 1985: 80).
In particular “the variables in “diffused religion” are, by contrast, more changeable according to the syntheses which it produces from time to time. They are achieved on levels determined by the dialectic between the basic values of primary and secondary legitimation and the “different” ones which appear on the horizon in the long confrontation with other ideological perspectives. The “new” value is internalized but almost never taken up in a wholly pure form or according to a formula that could totally replace the previous perspective. The new way of seeing reality, the different Weltanschauung, is, however, the result of the collision-encounter between what already exists and what is still in the process of becoming” (Cipriani 1989: 29).
Diffused religion is thus quite dynamic in itself as regards its development despite the constancy of the chief frame of reference. However, “diffused religion lacks the kind of clear-cut characteristics which would be visible in, for example, church attendance, but it works through long-range conditioning, which is due, above all, to mass religious socialization, and to which there is a corresponding kind of “mass loyalty” of a new type” (Cipriani 1989: 46). However, we can discover these links between the social and the religious, between implementation in the everyday and the context of origin by way of certain value indicators.
A particular example of this is provided by “a piece of empirical research conducted in Sicily by means of questionnairing a group of people selected by statistical sampling. The results were compiled from the completed questionnaires of 719 subjects, and the objective was to illuminate the concept of “diffused religion” as observed in the presence of common social values which tend to unify behavior and attitude deriving from both the religious and lay perspectives. Cluster analysis was used to identify six different groupings: religious (church) acritical; religious (church) critical; religious (diverging from the church) critical; religious (diffused) as a condition; religious (critical and distancing self from the church); and not religious. The starting point for the research is the hypothesis that Catholicism (as the dominant religion) pervades many sectors of social life and maintains its influence over common values, despite the effect of increased distance between people and institutionalized religion. This appears to refute the theory of secularization” (Cipriani 1993: 91).
Here are the general data from the study (Cipriani 1992):
Religious (church) acritical 101 (14.0%)
Religious (church) critical 261 (36.3%)
Religious (diverging from the church) critical 79 (11.0%)
Religious (diffused) as a condition 190 (26.4%)
Religious (distancing self from church) critical 47 ( 6.5%)
Non religious 41 ( 5.8%)
Total 719 (100%)
On the basis of these results, we have argued that religion of values embraces the central categories of the above table. In particular the area that can be ascribed to the religion of values runs from the category defined as religious (church) critical to that described as religious (distancing self from church) critical, and thus includes both a part of church religion (the less indulgent part) and the whole gamut of diffused religion, along with all forms of critical religion. Thus the framework of non-institutional religion appears much broader, being based on shared values which are represented essentially by choices acted upon (to a maximum of four responses) by those interviewed in terms of guiding principles of their life, commencing with education received up to eighteen:
Particularistic values
Attachment to the family 450 (62.6%)
Love of one’s children 232 (32.3%)
Good use of money 69 ( 9.6%)
Managing by oneself 66 ( 9.2%)
Earning a lot 32 ( 4.5%)
Universal values
Honesty, probity 532 (74.0%)
Faith in God 386 (53.7%)
Respect for others 213 (29.6%)
Having a clear conscience 131 (18.2%)
Attachment to work 120 (16.7%)
Friendship, solidarity 105 (14.6%)
Being content with little 99 (13.8%)
Generosity, charity 96 (13.4%)
As can easily be deduced from these percentages reflecting different value elements, it is reasonable to maintain that we are faced not only with a religion based on values largely shared since they have been diffused chiefly through primary and, later, secondary socialization, but these very values can be seen in themselves as a kind of religion. This religion has lay, profane, secular threads.
In essence, we have gone from a dominant church religion to a majoritarian diffused religion, and then to a religion compounded of values. As we shall attempt to show later, the conclusion is that religion can be defined as a mode of transmission and diffusion of values; indeed, that it performs especially this functional task and does so efficiently.
Thus we resolve the polemic between substantive and functional definitions. In the substantive sense the constituent elements of a religion are the values it teaches and propagates, whilst in the functional sense the task of religion, especially when it appears prevalently in a particular historico-geographical framework, is that of providing key linkage points for community life, social action, and the “rational choices” to be made in the light of established guidelines, and to be brought to life in everyday life and basic existential choices.
Content and function of religion
Our reading of the Italian situation is largely applicable to those social realities where a specific religious confession is conspicuously present and active in the area, with a hegemonic position. “In fact, religion, which never really stopped playing its part in society, has reappeared beneath the surface of secularization. Even if we admit that there has been a significant occlusion, this has only involved secondary, external and formal aspects, especially at the level of ritual. The decline in participation at official, preordained services has not thus meant the end of every resort to the sacred. The trajectory of religiosity is not set towards definitive extinction. Simultaneously, secular impulses seem also to have exhausted their impetus. Their efficacy now affects only the less fundamental aspects of belief, which tends to remain in essence more or less stable. Between religiosity and secularization there seems to reign almost a tacit compromise. They are reinforced and weaken virtually in unison. Aspects steeped in religion continue (or return) to manifest themselves in secular reality, whilst in the reality of the church and of religious culture we see a progressive surrender to demands that are less orthodox from the viewpoint of the official model” (Cipriani 1994: 277).
The case of Rome, described as the Holy City par excellence even though it is heavily secularized, is emblematic. The world capital of Catholicism, the meeting-place of universal import for millions of pilgrims in the jubilee year, 2000, manifests rather low levels of religious practice. That which is described as regular, once a week, stands at 23.3% (Cipriani 1997), whilst 22.1% never go to mass. Yet the number who pray is significant – 71.5% of those interviewed who turn to prayer maybe only a few times a year (14.9%) or much more often, like the 32% who do so once or more times every day. This means that there is at once slight attachment to practice but equally a broad interest in prayer, and so religion lies not wholly in rituality. Rather, the most frequent link with divinity runs through prayer, a direct conversation, as at the interpersonal level. In this regard we might argue that whereas practice of the festal mass is more linked to church religion, that of recourse to prayer maybe has a more spontaneous character, free and removed from social control but nonetheless an index which reveals a belief, a tie, a sensitivity at the religious level. In practice, if Rome is not by any means a city of many practitioners, neither is it one with many atheists, agnostics or religious indifferent people (however, it should be noted that 21.3% of those interviewed – the highest number in the whole of the country – show no sign of religiosity at all). The capital of Italy manifests in a heightened manner some of the characteristics revealed in the 1994-5 study on “religiosity in Italy” through a national sample. For example, in a year a more 7.6% had taken part in pilgrimages and 13.6% had made or satisfied a vow. Essentially, the Romans’ religion is two-sided: on the one hand it appears imbued with a dramatic crisis, on the other it seems quite lively (though at a due distance from the habits of the official church). The religious future of the city seems destined to proceed along these two parts, divergent but tendentially parallel.
The same may be said in general for Italy, though with certain essential differences. “A double religion is the result: a majority and a minority religion, explicable also in terms of the historic presence of the Catholic church in Italy in the past century and especially since the Second World War. The Italian minority religion is for those who identify with the church quite closely and also involve themselves significantly in religious practices. The majority religion, on the contrary, lacks these characteristics” (Cipriani: 1994: 281). This majority religion is rooted in the individual conscience, guided by the law of God, according to 40.4% of those interviewed in a systematic sample of 4500 (Cesareo, Cipriani, Garelli, Lanzetti, Rovati 1995: 180), in individual conscience alone in 36% of those sampled, and exclusively in the law of God for 22.1%. On the level of values lived with satisfaction, we find first the family that can be depended upon (73% of the sample), followed by working honestly and with commitment (68%), having friends (38%). A smaller response was obtained as regards devotion to others (25%) and commitment to changing society (22%).
The overall picture is a varied one, but it confirms the image of religiosity diffused but fractal, tattered, with heterogeneous outlines. According to the results of the cluster analysis, 32% of the sample could be classified as belonging to church religion, 59.1% to diffused or modal religion, and 8.9% to non-religion.
In detail, the proportions of Italian religiosity demonstrate the following typology:
1) Oriented church religion (hetero-directed) 9.4%
2) Reflexive church religion (self-directed) 22.6%
Church religion total (1+2) 32.0%
3) Modal primary (diffused) religion 16.5%
4) Modal intermediary (diffused) religion 21.6%
5) Modal perimetric (diffused) religion 21.0%
Diffused or modal religion total (3+4+5) 59.1%
Continuing religion total (1+2+3+4+5) 91.1%
6) Non religion 8.9%
Overall total (1+2+3+4+5+6) 100.0%
As can be seen from the percentage of the six attitudinal and behavioral classes, religion in the broad sense (church or diffuse/modal) is broadly preponderant and clearly almost all of Catholic imprint. Church religion is in a minority percentage-wise, and diffused religion (called modal as statistically it is in practice the mode, the characteristic with the greatest frequency) is the majority. But between minority and majority there is no break and indeed it is often hard to establish the distinction between one and the other, especially between reflexive church religion (more autonomous and individualized, less inclined to accept the directives of official ecclesiastical teaching), and primary diffused or modal religion (more diversified as regards church membership). In fact, church and diffused or modal religion are in a close relation with one another, the second arising from the first, whereby one can speak of a genuine religious continuum which involves 91.1% of those interviewed, without breaks or interruptions in the religious argument and its content, especially in the field of values.
Even more convincing, if that is possible, is what emerges from the more recent (March-April 1999) international comparative study on Europe and the United States on “religious and moral pluralism”, involving in Italy the universities of Turin, Padua, Trieste, Bologna and Rome. The Italian sampling was carried out by Doxa and involved 2149 interviews (1032 males and 1117 females from 18 and upwards), carried out in 742 cases in provincial capital cities and in 1407 in non-capital centers. 97.5% said they were Catholic; 31.2% said they were very close to the church and 45.5% close to it. 51.1% remembered at 12 years old they went to church at least once a week, but 21.7% spoke of more than once a week, and 6.7% of daily participation in religious functions.
Significant confirmation of the satisfaction with religion comes from the judgement of whether it was more or less important, 22.2% a little more, and 12.8% much more.
As for the relation between education and religion, a very close link is taken for granted especially if we bear in mind that 35.9% seemed much influenced by the education they received.
It should also be noted that 81.2% of those surveyed explicitly owned to belonging to a church, confession, group or religious community.
Finally, 86.4% said they used prayer, though with differences both quantitative (once or more) and temporal (daily or during the year).
The characteristics seem definitely established:
1) the essential content of religion is values, much more than rituals and beliefs;
2) the function of religion appears to be that of diffusing values.
Thus religion can be understood as basically an agent for diffusing values.
Conclusion
The concept of diffused religion over fifteen years has often been employed to test its heuristic efficacy. Starting from an initial applicability to the Italian case, it is possible to move on to presenting it also in other contexts in which the centrality and size of a specific religious confession are characteristic.
However, the most significant result is the demonstration of the centrality of values as the base of every religious expression. Beyond the socializing, consoling participation in ceremonies and belief-faith in something which in sociological terms escapes any empirical analysis, it is perhaps values which serve as the master key of the religious system.
The Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1983: 600) was thus correct when about three centuries ago he wrote that “religions are the only means by which men can understand virtuous behavior and practice it”.
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LA RELIGIONE COME DIFFUSIONE DI VALORI.
di Roberto Cipriani (Università di Roma Tre)
Premessa
Si discute spesso sulle possibili definizioni della religione: in linea di massima si distingue fra un approccio sostantivo ed un approccio funzionale. Sarebbe sostantivo quello di Durkheim (1995) che parla di “credenze e pratiche” come base costitutiva della “comunità morale” detta “chiesa”, sarebbe funzionale quello di Luckmann (1967) che si riferisce agli “universi simbolici” come “sistemi di significato socialmente oggettivati”, attraverso “processi sociali” – considerati “fondamentalmente religiosi” – “che conducono alla formazione dell’Io” ed alla “trascendenza della natura biologica”.
Ma a ben scavare nei testi durkheimiani ed in quelli luckmanniani ci si accorge che Durkheim è anche attento alla funzione (la religione serve per la solidarietà) e che Luckmann non bada solo alla funzione (la religione è una concezione del mondo costituita da contenuti specifici).
Dunque già coloro che vengono citati come campioni esemplari dell’una o dell’altra prospettiva definitoria in realtà poi risultano più possibilisti, aperti verso soluzioni meno rigide, polivalenti. Insomma contenuti e funzioni non sono separabili ed anzi vanno considerati come un unicum, il che consente l’implementazione di percorsi analitici ed interpretativi ben più complessi ed articolati.
Si potrebbe partire, per esempio, dall’idea che il riferimento metaempirico nell’attribuzione di significato all’esistenza umana sia un carattere peculiare della religione, ma in pari tempo è opportuno lasciare un varco aperto anche a soluzioni che non contemplino un esplicito rinvio alla dimensione della non verificabilità empirica e della impraticabilità dell’esperienza diretta. Insomma il riferimento metaempirico avrebbe solo un carattere meramente orientativo, “sensibilizzante” per dirla con Blumer (1954). “In tal modo non si ha un contrasto fra livello trascendente e livello reale. In sostanza è come se da due diversi punti di vista si guardasse ad un medesimo oggetto: l’innervamento di una presenza non umana nella realtà ed il radicamento di un significato esplicativo all’interno della stessa realtà. L’una delle due visioni non esclude l’altra, non vi si oppone, anzi vi può essere talora una convergenza che approdi al medesimo risultato: la comprensione-spiegazione della vita in chiave religiosa” (Cipriani 1997: 15).
Dalla religione diffusa alla religione dei valori
Indubbiamente la presenza di valori è una costante sia delle religioni storiche, più radicate a livello culturale, sia dei nuovi movimenti religiosi, ancora in fase di crescita ed assestamento. Tali valori rappresentano dei motivi ideali, dei concetti-guida, delle idee di base, dei parametri di riferimento, degli orientamenti ideologici, che presiedono all’agire personale ed interpersonale degli individui, lo rendono plausibile, socialmente collocabile, sociologicamente classificabile.
Orbene, ogni esperienza religiosa comporta una dedizione ad una causa, ad un ideale, con un coinvolgimento socio-individuale più o meno accentuato secondo le intenzionalità dei singoli, la loro convenienza (anche in termini di rational choice), la loro storia biografica, le occasioni presentatesi, gli incontri avuti, le prove affrontate. Il dirsi appartenenti ad una certa religione significa essenzialmente condividerne i principi di massima, le opzioni di fondo, le modalità rituali. Queste ultime consentono una visibilità delle appartenenze, l’incontro con i correligionari, la legittimazione dei ruoli operativi (e di potere, non solo simbolico), il rinforzo dell’adesione, l’approfondimento delle motivazioni valoriali.
Detto altrimenti, ogni celebrazione di un rito svolge funzioni molteplici, ma soprattutto mette a fuoco l’insieme di valori che una certa religione promuove e diffonde attraverso i suoi membri, i quali più partecipano più si convincono della loro scelta come giusta.
Quest’ultimo effetto è di tale pregnanza che permane, seppur indebolito, anche in assenza di una successiva, ulteriore partecipazione continua. Dunque l’esperienza della pratica (e della credenza) religiosa induce di per sé un habitus ideale e valoriale che tende a persistere ben al di là di una religiosità visibile. Infatti anche chi non è più praticante e magari è anche sempre meno credente conserva una sorta di imprinting, non facilmente cancellabile, che lo vede come membro disaffezionato ma con legami ancora significativi con l’ex gruppo di riferimento.
Molto si deve indubbiamente alla socializzazione, in verità più alla primaria (eesenzialmente familiare) che alla secondaria (scolastica ed amicale nell’ambito dei peer groups). La lezione berger-luckmanniana (1966) in proposito rimane magistrale: in effetti la costruzione sociale della realtà è la base da cui si dipartono le ramificazioni costitutive dell’impianto valoriale che presiede all’agire sociale, facendo leva su una concezione del mondo oggettivata e storicizzata e perciò dotata di un carattere religioso dal quale non è facile prescindere. Lo stesso significato ultimo della vita vi si inscrive a chiare lettere ed orienta atteggiamenti e comportamenti.
Ora però, invece di differenziare al massimo fra una religiosità tradizionale, legata alle strutture di chiesa ed abbastanza visibile nelle sue forme, da una parte ed una religiosità più individualizzata, privatizzata e dunque meno visibile, dall’altra, può essere più opportuno giocare su una disarticolazione interna alla fenomenologia religiosa in chiave di dinamiche più stratificate, dalle sfaccettature molteplici. In pratica non è detto che vi siano solo una religione di chiesa ed una religione invisibile alla Luckmann (1967), è ipotizzabile piuttosto un’altra soluzione che preveda categorie intermedie più o meno vicine ai due poli definiti in termini di visibilità/invisibilità.
Una prima interpretazione post-luckmanniana venne formulata nel 1983 ed applicata alla situazione italiana in occasione della Conferenza Internazionale di Sociologia della Religione (tenutasi al Bedford College di Londra): “beside the interests and pressures coming from ecclesiastical sources, are there any other premises or factors which can explain religious bearing on Italian politics? In particular, it is important to verify first of all how the institution fares under the pressure of an extended “religious field” containing varied and attractive options, including anti-institutional purposes. Secondly, we must ask ourselves whether in practice religious influence in political choices concerns only Catholicism (or Christianity) or any religious expression in general. Thirdly, we must see whether the country’s history or its national culture mark the existence of fixed elements, bearing common values leading (directly or indirectly, in specific or vague ways) to a widespread model of religious socialization (based prevalently on patters of Catholic reference)” (Cipriani 1984: 32).
Il punto di partenza era dunque rappresentato dall’influenza della religione cattolica sulla politica in Italia. Si trattava di un indicatore casuale ma rivelatosi assai illuminante in seguito, anche perché sempre più è stato possibile verificare che una simile influenza riguardava e riguarda ambiti ben più ampi della politica. Anzi, oggi dopo quasi un ventennio è dato constatare che il peso della religione si è ridotto nei riguardi delle decisioni di natura partitica e governativa ma è rimasto piuttosto saldo nei confronti della società in genere. Nel contempo si è attenuato lo spirito antistituzionale, visto che la chiesa cattolica è l’istituzione meno osteggiata dai cittadini italiani, che peraltro le assegnano quote non trascurabili della loro tasse (il cosiddetto “otto per mille”).
Venuta meno l’incidenza preponderante del cattolicesimo ufficiale non si sono sostituite ad esso altre confessioni religiose. Semmai solo l’ebraismo è riuscito in qualche occasione particolare ad ottenere rispetto per le proprie scadenze festive e per le proprie consuetudini. Del tutto trascurabile appare la capacità degli islamici, dei “Testimoni di Geova” e di altri di farsi ascoltare a livello politico.
Invece è ampiamente dimostrata la connessione fra valori religiosi cattolici e valori diffusi in ambito sociale. In molti casi vi è sovrapposizione fra gli uni e gli altri, se non proprio una totale identificazione. A dire il vero, dopo essere partiti dal concetto di “religione diffusa” in riferimento soprattutto ai legami con la dimensione politica, siamo poi approdati ad una concezione della religione presente in Italia come intessuta di elementi valoriali derivati direttamente dal bagaglio della socializzazione cattolica.
Prima però di procedere oltre, conviene chiarire meglio che cosa si intendeva perseguire originariamente nel nostro studio. “The leading concept, in this research, is that of “diffused religion”. The term “diffused” is to be understood in at least a double sense. First of all, it is diffused in that it comprises vast sections of the Italian population and goes beyond the simple limits of church religion; sometimes in fact it is in open contrast with church religion on religious motivation (cf. the internal dissension within Catholicism on occasion of the referendum on divorce and abortion). Besides, it has become widespread, since it has been shown to be a historical and cultural result of the almost bi-millenial presence of the Catholic institution in Italy and of its socializing and legitimizing action. The premises for the present “diffused religion” have been laid down in the course of centuries. In reality, it is both diffused in and diffused by. As a final outcome, it is also diffused for; given that – apart from the intents of so-called church religion – we can remark the spread of other creeds (the easy proselytism of other Christian churches, of the “Jehovah’s Witnesses”, of “sects” of oriental origin etc…), as well as the trend towards ethical and/or political choices (an eventual conflict – far form disproving this hypothesis – confirms, from the outset, the existence of a religious basis, be it weak or latent). In brief terms, it is licit to think of religion as being “diffused” through the acceptance of other individual or group religious experience, and also because it represents a parameter which can be referred to with regard to moral and/or political choices (Cipriani 1984: 32).
Innanzitutto resta tuttora valida l’affermazione che la religione diffusa investe larghi strati della popolazione italiana. Più di un’indagine ha consolidato nel tempo questa nostra convinzione, che via via si è arricchita di nuove variazioni sul tema ma senza stravolgimenti. Di per sé anche la cosiddetta religione di chiesa sarebbe parte fondamentale all’origine della stessa religione diffusa. Ma per ragioni esplicative e per evitare equivoci è preferibile considerarla come una categoria a parte, a sua volta scomponibile al suo interno in base a differenze attitudinali e comportamentali dei soggetti intervistati (di solito raggruppati insieme secondo stratificazioni suggerite dalla cluster analysis). Peraltro la sua diversificazione rispetto alla religione cattolica istituzionale appare necessaria in chiave sociologica al fine di accertare i punti discriminanti fra modalità ortodosse ed eterodosse rispetto al modello ufficiale cattolico. Ma l’aspetto più rilevante resta il forte radicamento storico-geografico e quindi culturale della religione più praticata in Italia. Appunto la forza della tradizione, la prassi dell’abitudine, il coinvolgimento familiare e comunitario rendono cogente, quasi imprescindibile l’appartenenza alla religione prevalente. Ove non arriva la socializzazione tra le mura domestiche sopraggiunge l’attività pastorale ed evangelizzatrice svolta capillarmente sul territorio da parte di sacerdoti e collaboratori laici parrocchiali. In effetti il cattolicesimo è diffuso in ogni parte del paese ad opera di una struttura di chiesa ben attrezzata da tempo e particolarmente capace di far ricorso ad un suo know how abbastanza efficace. Di tale efficacia la prova migliore è data dal facile proselitismo messo in atto da altri gruppi e movimenti religiosi, sopraggiunti in Italia, primi fra tutti quelli di marca cristiana (ma non solo). Un altro riscontro è rinvenibile nelle propensioni etiche e, specie nel passato, politiche. Questi caratteri della religione diffusa ne fanno un’esperienza non autocratica, aperta verso altre soluzioni, poco attenta ai confini teologico-dottrinali fra appartenenze confessionali molteplici. I soggetti della religione diffusa sono poco propensi ad intraprendere battaglie in nome dei loro ideali di riferimento ma neppure avversano gli altri per l’espressione di punti di vista non sempre condivisibili.
“What “diffused religion” consists of can be understood even by means of its peculiarities. In a broad sense, its presence is clearly visible in forms which are not as evident as church religion, but which are not totally invalidated. This visibility may appear somehow intermittent” (Cipriani 1984: 32). Dunque anche la religione diffusa rischia di essere classificata come una “religione invisibile” sui generis, ma in realtà essa presenta la peculiarità di rifarsi in parte alla religione di chiesa, attraverso la partecipazione alle pratiche liturgiche ed ai riti religiosi, ed in parte ad una “semiappartenenza” o persino non appartenenza (nelle sue forme più periferiche, quasi confinanti con l’assenza totale di indicatori religiosi).
“It is easy to presume that the widespread model of “diffused religion” is different from that of its source of origin, that is, this widespread religious dimension ends up by differing from the system it derives from (the institution). In this way, however, it reaches degrees of freedom which the concentrated and centralized pattern of church religion would not favour” (Cipriani 1984: 32). Si potrebbe persino parlare di religione diffusa come effetto perverso del sistema religioso dominante, che genera dunque ciò che è altro da sé, sebbene in continuità con se stesso. La maggiore libertà nel porsi al di fuori della chiesa consente spazi di azione altrimenti impediti. Insomma non vi è né netta opposizione ma neppure una netta adesione della religione diffusa alla religione di chiesa.
“The fragmentation of the areas of diffusion and distribution cannot, however, cover all existing spheres; all aspects are not equally widespread and reach vague, undefined limits which empirically are difficult to define. This diffusiveness broadens foreseeably into complex and multiple options (especially political options: from extreme right to extreme left). Meanwhile, original religious contents diminish and lose their intensity, they disperse, they mingle, they are integrated in new syntheses. Consequently, this expansion also causes a certain lack of positive reactions with respect to the centre of propulsion, either because of increased separateness or because of a weakening of the basic ideological nucleus. It is thus a “passive” religion which may become active again in specific circumstances. Rather than the dynamics of accelerated religious transformation, this provokes a certain stagnation. Even within the prevailing passivity, the underlying echo remains persistent and pervasive, it penetrates large groups of persons. At this stage “diffused religion” appears rather under false pretencies: as a feeling, a sensation which “contaminates” both the religious and political fields. Thus re-emerges the link with processes of socialization. It remains, however, to be seen if the future generations will maintain such a religious form which becomes more and more socially diluted to the extent of losing all influence on politics” (Cipriani 1984: 32-3). Nonostante la sua pervasività la religione diffusa non è presente in ogni caso ed in ogni contesto. Infatti non è agevolmente catalogabile secondo indicatori omogenei. Di solito la cluster analysis delinea tre livelli di religione diffusa: il primo appare più vicino alla religione di chiesa, il secondo se ne discosta parzialmente, il terzo si colloca ai margini del continuum fra religione di chiesa e religione diffusa. Se si guarda in particolare alla collocazione politica tutto l’arco ideologico-partitico ha i suoi seguaci distribuiti nelle tre grandi aree della religione diffusa. L’appartenente alle classi della religione diffusa preferisce soluzioni che vanno dalla destra all’estrema sinistra, con esclusione dunque dell’estrema destra – come risulta da un’indagine svolta a Rona tra il 1994 ed il 1995 (Cipriani 1997) -. Sul piano dei valori sembra restringersi l’area di quelli strettamente religiosi, ma è in aumento quella dei principii laici ma vagamente ispirati od ispirabili a modelli ortoreligiosi. Sembra dunque che la religione diffusa sia destinata a restare inerte in balia di altre confessioni. Ma il suo richiamo maggiore è nei confronti della socializzazione pregressa.
Una decina di anni fa era già stato posto il problema del mutamento all’interno della stessa religione diffusa. In effetti “even for someone who has always kept his sociological interest in current events alive, it is not easy to disentangle the guiding threads of the social, political, and religious dynamics which have characterized Italy in the last two decades. The fact is that one finds oneself in the present situation almost naturally, as though it had been expected, without even letting questions, doubts, or scientific curiosity about what has been happening to more than 50 million citizens, from the mid-1960s to the treshold of the 1990s, break the surface” (Cipriani 1989: 24). Il fatto è che mentre mutano, quasi impercettibilmente, i contenuti della religione diffusa anche l’approccio sociologico si modifica, mette a punto i suoi strumenti di analisi empirica, scava più a fondo nella realtà e cerca verifiche o falsifiche delle ipotesi-guida.
A dire il vero fino a quel momento, alla fine degli anni ’80, non si disponeva ancora – stranamente – di risultati scientifici abbastanza affidabili e frutto di indagini serie, complete e realmente rappresentative sul piano statistico in relazione all’intero territorio italiano. Fu dunque sulla scorta degli interrogativi sollevati dalla teorizzazione sulla religione diffusa che iniziò una stagione fertile di ricerche sul campo: dall’inchiesta siciliana su La religione dei valori (Cipriani 1992) alla grande indagine nazionale su La religiosità in Italia (Cesareo, Cipriani, Garelli, Lanzetti, Rovati 1995), a quella recentissima a carattere internazionale e con una comparazione fra Europa e Stati Uniti su Religious and moral pluralism, ancora in via di pubblicazione.
Soprattutto nel corso di quest’ultimo decennio si è constatato che le relazioni fra chiesa cattolica e stato italiano – anche se non del tutto scomparse come punto strategico per la verifica del legame interistituzionale a carattere politico e religioso fondato sull’interesse dei cittadini per i problemi di natura legislativa (si pensi alla diatriba degli anni ’70 ed ’80 sul divorzio e sull’aborto, per nulla paragonabile a quella attuale sul finanziamento pubblico delle scuole cattoliche) – non sono più un test di prova della capacità della religione dominante di influire sulle vicende politiche italiane. Una volta regolate – in forma solenne il 18 febbraio 1984 e poi con una legge il 20 maggio 1985 – le questioni maggiori sul piano diplomatico, mediante il rinnovo del Concordato del 1929 fra stato italiano e gerarchia vaticana, la cosiddetta “questione cattolica” sembra aver perduto mordente ed interesse. Anche il movimento definito come contestazione cattolica ha da tempo tirato i remi in barca e sembra ridursi ora a qualche sporadico tentativo di dissenso rispetto all’establishment, a meno che l’occasione dell’Anno Santo del 2000 non offra nuove occasioni di ripresa in chiave critica, prendendo spunto dagli eventi giubilari.
In qualche misura proprio la religione diffusa rappresenta anche una sorta di sostituto funzionale della divergenza dalla struttura ecclesiastica. Tale differenziazione si manifesta attraverso altri modi di credere e praticare, anche se la base di fondo rimane cattolica grazie alla socializzazione primaria nelle fasi iniziali dell’esistenza. Va perciò ribadito che “ “diffused religion” refers to the characteristic conduct of believers who have received at least a Catholic education and who relate to it in a general sense. In fact, it refers to citizens who appear to be less than completely obedient to the directives of the Catholic hierarchy but who, on the other hand, refuse to reject completely certain basic principles which form part of the set of values promoted by Catholicism” (Cipriani 1989: 28).
Il nucleo essenziale della religione diffusa è rinvenibile proprio in questo insieme di valori che costituiscono la base della condivisione di orientamenti e pratiche che accomunano cattolici e non cattolici, credenti e non credenti, sul medesimo terreno dell’ agire in società. Insomma attraverso questa mediazione culturale di valori condivisi passa gran parte delle decisioni operative assunte dai soggetti sociali. L’establishment ecclesiastico resta sullo sfondo, non interviene direttamente ma in modo mediato, cioè grazie alla sua precedente azione socializzatrice. Non c’è più, se mai vi è stata, una stretta accondiscendenza all’ortodossia ed all’ortoprassi insegnate dalla chiesa cattolica, eppure il parametro essenziale resta il cattolicesimo come ideologia di orientamento. Appunto questo consente una collaborazione fra stato italiano e chiesa cattolica senza grandi turbative e con un’intesa anche formale e legittimata che dura ormai da più di settanta anni.
Come sottolineano Calvaruso ed Abbruzzese (1985: 79), “diffused religiosity then becomes the dominant religious dimension for all those who, immersed in the secular reality of contemporary society, though not mananging to accept these dimensions of the sacred cosmos which are more remote and provocative compared with the rational vision of the world, do not thereby abandon their need for meaningfullness. In the immanent dimension of individual everyday existence, diffused religiosity, rather than bearing witness to the presence of a process of laicization in a religiously oriented society, seems to enhance the permanence of the sacred in the secularized society”. Dunque la religione diffusa appare come un antidoto al processo di secolarizzazione, di cui però è in pari tempo un’espressione significativa come presa di distanza dalla religione di chiesa. Infatti “diffused religiosity is located in an intermediate area between a secular society in crisis and a resumption of the ecclesiastical administration of the sacred. It remains too “lay” to accept the more specific elements of church doctrine and too much in need of meaning to survive in an epoch which is “without God and without prophets”” (Calvaruso e Abbruzzese 1985: 80).
In particolare “the variables in “diffused religion” are, by contrast, more changeable according to the syntheses which it produces from time to time. They are achieved on levels determined by the dialectic between the basic values of primary and secondary legitimation and the “different” ones which appear on the horizon in the long confrontation with other ideological perspectives. The “new” value is internalized but almost never taken up in a wholly pure form or according to a formula that could totally replace the previous perspective. The new way of seeing reality, the different Weltanschauung, is, however, the result of the collision-encounter between what already exists and what is still in the process of becoming” (Cipriani 1989: 29).
Dunque la religione diffusa è di per sé abbastanza dinamica nei suoi sviluppi nonostante la costante del quadro principale di riferimento. Tuttavia “diffused religion lachs the kind of clear-cut characteristics which would be visible in, for example, church attendance, but it works through long-range conditioning, which is due, above all, to mass religious socialization, and to which there is a corresponding kind of “mass loyalty” of a new type” (Cipriani 1989: 46). Però è possibile mediante alcuni indicatori valoriali scoprire questi legami tra il sociale ed il religioso, tra l’implementazione nel quotidiano ed il contesto di provenienza.
Un esempio peculiare è fornito da “a piece of empirical research conducted in Sicily by means of questionnairing a group of people selected by statistical sampling. The results were compiled from the completed questionnaires of 719 subjects, and the objective was to illuminate the concept of “diffused religion” as observed in the presence of common social values which tend to unify behaviour and attitude deriving from both the religious and lay perspectives. Cluster analysis was used to identify six different groupings: religious (church) acritical; religious (church) critical; religious (diverging from the church) critical; religious (diffused) as a condition; religious (critical and distancing self from the church); and not religious. The starting point for the research is the hypothesis that Catholicism (as the dominant religion) pervades many sectors of social life and maintains its influence over common values, despite the effect of increased distance between people and institutionalized religion. This appears to refute the theory of secularization” (Cipriani 1993: 91).
Ed ecco i dati generali dell’indagine (Cipriani 1992):
Religious (church) acritical 101 (14,0%)
Religious (church) critical 261 (36,3%)
Religious (diverging from the church) critical 79 (11,0%)
Religious (diffused) as a condition 190 (26,4%)
Religious (distancing self from church) critical 47 ( 6,5%)
Non religious 41 ( 5,8%)
TOTAL 719 (100%)
Sulla base di questi risultati abbiamo sostenuto che la religione dei valori abbraccia le categorie centrali della tabella presentata sopra. In particolare l’ambito ascrivibile alla religione dei valori andrebbe dalla categoria definita come religious (church) critical a quella indicata come religious (distancing self from church) critical, dunque comprendendo sia una parte della religione di chiesa (quella meno corriva), sia tutto l’arco della religione diffusa, sia ogni forma di religione critica. Risulterebbe così ben più ampio il quadro della religiosità non istituzionale, fondata su valori condivisi e rappresentati essenzialmente dalle scelte operate (fino ad un massimo di quattro risposte) dagli intervistati in termini di principi-guida della loro vita, a partire dall’educazione ricevuta fino all’età di diciotto anni:
Valori particolaristici
Attaccamento alla famiglia 450 (62,6%)
Amore per i figli 232 (32,3%)
Buon uso del denaro 69 ( 9,6%)
Fare da soli 66 ( 9,2%)
Guadagnare molto 32 ( 4,5%)
Valori universalistici
Onestà, serietà 532 (74,0%)
Fede in Dio 386 (53,7%)
Rispetto degli altri 213 (29,6%)
Aver la coscienza a posto 131 (18,2%)
Attaccamento al lavoro 120 (16,7%)
Amicizia, solidarietà 105 (14,6%)
Accontentarsi del poco 99 (13,8%)
Generosità, carità 96 (13,4%)
Come è facile desumere dalle percentuali fatte segnare dai diversi elementi valoriali è plausibile sostenere che non solo siamo di fronte ad una vera e propria religione dei valori, cioè basata su valori largamente condivisi – perché diffusi grazie alla socializzazione soprattutto primaria e poi secondaria -, ma gli stessi valori possono essere considerati di per se stessi quasi una sorta di religione con venature laiche, profane, secolari. In definitiva, come si cercherà di sostenere in seguito, si è passati da una religione di chiesa dominante ad una religione diffusa maggioritaria e quindi ad una religione articolata attraverso valori: la conclusione è che la religione può essere definita una modalità di trasmissione e diffusione dei valori, anzi che essa svolge peculiarmente tale compito funzionale e lo svolge in modo efficace.
Si risolve così anche la diatriba fra definizioni sostantive e definizioni funzionali: in chiave sostantiva gli elementi costituenti di una religione sono i valori che essa insegna e propala, mentre in chiave funzionale il compito della religione – specialmente quando essa appare come prevalente in un dato quadro storico-geografico – è quello di offrire punti nevralgici di aggancio per la vita comunitaria, per l’agire sociale, per le scelte “razionali” da compiere sulla scorta di linee-guida acquisite e da porre in essere nella vita quotidiana e nelle scelte esistenziali fondamentali.
Contenuti e funzione della religione
La nostra lettura della situazione italiana è applicabile in buona misura a quelle realtà sociali in cui una specifica confessione religiosa è cospicuamente presente ed attiva sul territorio, in posizione egemone. “In fact, religion, which never really stopped playing its part in society, has reappeared beneath the surface of secularization. Even if we admit that there has been a significant occlusion, this has only involved secondary, external and formal aspects, especially at the level of ritual. The decline in participation at official, preordained services has not thus meant the end of every resort to the sacred. The trajectory of religiosity is not set towards definitive extinction. Simultaneously, secular impulses seem also to have exhausted their impetus. Their efficacy now affects only the less fundamental aspects of belief, which tends to remain in essence more or less stable. Between religiosity and secularization there seems to reign almost a tacit compromise. They are reinforced and weaken virtually in unison. Aspects steeped in religion continue (or return) to manifest themselves in secular reality, whilst in the reality of the church and of religious culture we see a progressive surrender to demands that are less orthodox from the viewpoint of the official model” (Cipriani 1994: 277).
Emblematico è il caso di Roma, chiamata città sacra per eccellenza eppure fortemente secolarizzata. La capitale mondiale del cattolicesimo, luogo di convergenza universale per milioni di pellegrini in occasione del giubileo del 2000, presenta livelli piuttosto bassi di pratica religiosa: quella dichiarata come regolare, cioè una volta per settimana, è del 23,3% (Cipriani 1997) mentre il 22,1% non va mai a messa; ma è consistente il tasso di coloro che pregano, in quanto si tratta del 71,5% degli intervistati, i quali si dedicano alla preghiera magari anche solo qualche volta in un anno (14,9%) o ben più spesso, come fa il 32%, cioè una o più volte ogni giorno. Dunque si registra nel contempo uno scarso attaccamento alla pratica ma altresì un ampio interesse per la preghiera. Ciò significa che la ritualità non è tutto nella religione e che anzi il legame più frequente con la divinità passa attraverso l’orazione, cioè un colloquio diretto, come a livello interpersonale. Si potrebbe a tal proposito sostenere che mentre la pratica della messa festiva è più legata ad una religione di chiesa quella del ricorso alla preghiera ha un carattere forse più spontaneo, libero, sottratto al controllo sociale, ma comunque indicatore, rivelatore di una credenza, di un legame, di una sensibilità a livello religioso. In pratica, se Roma non è certo una città di tanti praticanti non lo è neppure di molti atei, agnostici o indifferenti sul piano religioso (va tuttavia tenuto presente che il 21,3% dei soggetti intervistati – il tasso più alto in assoluto di tutto il paese – non mostra alcun segnale di religiosità). La capitale italiana presenta, accentuate, alcune caratteristiche rilevate nel campione nazionale della ricerca svolta nel 1994-95 sulla religiosità in Italia: per esempio, in un anno appena il 7,6% ha partecipato a pellegrinaggi ed il 13,6% ha fatto o soddisfatto un voto. In definitiva la religiosità dei romani è bifronte: per un verso si mostra come pervasa da una crisi drammatica, per un altro appare anche piuttosto vitale (sebbene a debita distanza dalle consuetudini della chiesa ufficiale). Il futuro religioso della città eterna sembra destinato a procedere lungo queste due direttrici divergenti ma anche tendenzialmente parallele.
Lo stesso può dirsi in linea di massima per l’Italia, sia pure con qualche differenza sostanziale. “A double religion is the result: a majority and a minority religion, explicable also in terms of the historic presence of the Catholic Church in Italy in the past century and especially since the Second World War. The Italian minority religion is for those who identify with the church quite closely and also involve themselves significantly in religious practices. The majority religion, on the contrary, lacks there characteristics” (Cipriani: 1994: 281). Tale religione di maggioranza si innerva nella coscienza individuale guidata dalla legge di Dio secondo il 40,4% degli intervistati su un campione ponderato di 4500 individui (Cesareo, Cipriani, Garelli, Lanzetti, Rovati 1995: 180), nella sola coscienza individuale per il 36% dell’universo campionato ed esclusivamente nella legge di Dio per il 22,1%. Sul piano dei valori vissuti con soddisfazione si trova al primo posto la famiglia su cui contare (nel 73% del campione), seguita dal lavorare con onestà ed impegno (secondo il 68% degli intervistati), dall’avere amici (per il 38% degli interrogati in proposito), dall’avere un buon rapporto affettivo (nel 35% dei casi), dall’essere sicuri del posto di lavoro (a detta del 34% dell’universo d’indagine). Più contenuti appaiono il dedicarsi agli altri (25%) e l’impegnarsi per modificare la società (22%).
Il quadro complessivo che ne risulta è variegato ma consolida l’immagine di una religiosità diffusa ma frattalica, frastagliata, con profili eterogenei. Secondo gli esiti della cluster analysis sarebbero classificabili come appartenenti alla religione di chiesa il 32% degli intervistati, alla religione diffusa (o modale) il 59,1%, alla non religione l’8,9%.
Nel dettaglio l’articolazione della religiosità italiana mostra la seguente tipologia:
1) Religione di chiesa orientata (eterodiretta) 9,4%
2) Religione di chiesa riflessiva (autodiretta) 22,6%
Totale della religione di chiesa (1+2) 32,0%
3) Religione modale (diffusa) primaria 16,5%
4) Religione modale (diffusa) intermedia 21,6%
5) Religione modale (diffusa) perimetrale 21,0%
Totale della religione modale o diffusa (3+4+5) 59,1%
Totale della religione continua (1+2+3+4+5) 91,1%
6) Non religione 8,9%
Totale generale (1+2+3+4+5+6) 100,0%
Come si vede dalla consistenza percentuale delle sei classi attitudinali e comportamentali, la religione in senso lato (sia di chiesa che modale o diffusa) è largamente preponderante ed è ovviamente quasi tutta di matrice cattolica. Percentualmente è minoritaria la religione di chiesa e maggioritaria quella diffusa (chiamata modale perché statisticamente è in pratica la moda, cioè il carattere al quale corrisponde la massima frequenza). Ma tra minoranza e maggioranza non c’è frattura, anzi spesso è difficile stabilire il discrimine fra l’una e l’altra, in particolare poi fra religione di chiesa riflessiva (più autonoma, più individualizzata, meno propensa ad accogliere le direttive del magistero ufficiale ecclesiastico) e religione modale o diffusa primaria (più diversificata rispetto all’appartenenza di chiesa). Infatti religione di chiesa e religione modale o diffusa sono in stretta relazione fra loro, anzi la seconda scaturisce dalla prima, per cui si può parlare di una vera e propria religione continua che concerne il 91,1% degli intervistati, senza soluzioni, senza interruzioni del discorso religioso e dei suoi contenuti, specialmente in campo valoriale.
Ancora più convincente, se possibile, è quanto emerge dalla più recente (marzo-aprile 1999) indagine internazionale comparata fra Europa e Stati Uniti su “Religious and moral pluralism”, che in Italia ha visto impegnate le università di Torino, Padova, Trieste, Bologna e Roma. Il campionamento italiano è stato messo a punto dalla Doxa ed ha riguardato 2149 interviste (1032 maschi e 1117 femmine, a partire dai diciottenni ed oltre), realizzate in 742 casi in comuni capoluoghi ed in 1407 in centri non capoluoghi.
Il 97,5% si è dichiarato cattolico; il 31,2% si e detto molto vicino alla chiesa; il 45,5% si è proclamato vicino ad essa. Il 51,1% ha ricordato che all’età di dodici anni andava in chiesa almeno una volta per settimana, ma c’è pure il 21,7% che ha parlato di più di una volta per settimana ed il 6,7% di una partecipazione quotidiana alle funzioni religiose.
Conferme significative sul gradimento della religione provengono dalla valutazione se essa sia più o meno importante rispetto a venti anni prima: il 29,6% ha sostenuto che essa è ugualmente importante, il 22,2% che lo sia un po’ di più, mentre il 12,8% ha ritenuto che lo sia molto di più.
Quanto poi al rapporto fra educazione e religione, è dato per scontato un nesso assai stretto soprattutto se si tien conto che il 35,9% degli intervistati appare molto influenzato dall’educazione ricevuta.
Va poi considerato che ben l’81,2% dell’universo indagato ha ammesso esplicitamente di appartenere ad una chiesa, confessione, gruppo o comunità religiosa.
Infine l’86,4% ha detto di dedicarsi alla preghiera, sia pure con diversificazioni sia quantitative (una o più volte) che temporali (ogni giorno o durante l’anno).
In definitiva sembrano abbastanza provate due caratteristiche:
1) i contenuti essenziali della religione sono i valori, ancor più dei riti e delle credenze;
2) la funzione della religione risulta essere proprio la diffusione dei valori.
Pertanto la religione può essere intesa sostanzialmente come agente diffusore di valori.
Conclusione
Il concetto di religione diffusa in oltre un quindicennio è stato più volte adoperato per sperimentarne l’efficacia euristica. A partire da un’originaria applicabilità al caso italiano si è passato anche a proporlo in altri contesti in cui fossero caratteristiche la centralità e la numerosità di una specifica confessione religiosa. I risultati probanti non mancano. Ma forse l’esito più significativo è la verifica della centralità dei valori come base portante di ogni espressione religiosa. Al di là della partecipazione socializzante e consolatoria alle cerimonie e della credenza-fiducia in qualcosa che, in termini sociologici, sfugge ad ogni analisi empirica, sono forse i valori a fungere da chiave di volta dell’impianto religioso.
Aveva dunque ragione il filosofo italiano Giambattista Vico (1983: 600) quando circa tre secoli fa scriveva che “religions are the only means by which men can understand virtuous behavior and practice it”.
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